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The purpose of this paper is to investigate whether the variation in the performance of Malaysian acquirers 
following cross-border acquisition (CBA) activities is explained by agency costs factors. This study uses one, 
two and three years buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) to measure acquisition performance and weighted 
least square regression to evaluate the impact of agency costs factors on acquisition performance. The findings 
suggest that the CBA performance is influenced by agency costs of the acquirers where those with lower 
agency costs, characterized by higher institutional ownership, higher board gender diversity, and higher board 
ethnic diversity perform better. The sample was restricted to CBAs in Malaysia, which limits the 
generalization of the findings to other countries.The results are reasonable to serve as guide to policy makers 
to make appropriate policy concerning the representation of female and various races on board of directors.  
The results could also guide in making appropriate investment policy decision that will result in long-term 
performance of acquiring firms.The novel contribution of this study is in terms of revealing the applicability 
of corporate finance theories in explaining CBA performance in emerging markets where CBAs are 
aggressively undertaken and high failure rates of CBAs are reported using long term datasets and robust 
performance measures and analyses. 
 
Keywords: Cross-border acquisition; Shareholders’ wealth effect; Buy-and-hold abnormal returns; Agency 
costs and Bursa Malaysia. 
___________________________________ 
 
Received: 8 August 2017 





Cross-border acquisition (CBA) has long been used as an important investment strategy for firms’ 
international strategic expansion. CBA enables firms to access new markets faster, acquire 
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resources and strategic assets, improve efficiency, diversify into related market and create 
synergies. CBA has become a major mode-of-entry for developing-country firms into other 
countries (Aulakh, 2007). From the broader economic perspective, CBA allows capital to be 
reallocated more freely and more efficiently to its highest use in economic terms. 
 
Malaysia as an advanced emerging market in Asian has involved aggressively in CBA deals as 
early 1990s (UNCTAD, 2014). In aggregate statistical terms, the rise of CBA by Malaysian 
corporations has been phenomenal. The average value of CBA for the period from 2000 to 2009 
was almost 4.33 times of the period from 1990 to 1999. Moreover, on an average, Malaysia has 
recorded a substantial number of CBA activities during the recent years. Based on the data from 
2014 World Development Report by UNCTAD, Malaysia is in the third position among south-east 
Asia countries, in the 10th position among Asian countries and 19th position globally in terms of 
CBA value (see Table 1). 
 
 
Table 1: Ranking based on value and deal of CBA 
Region Malaysia’s rank based on value of 
CBA   
Malaysia’s rank based on  
deal of CBA   
World 19th 17th 
Asia 10th 5th 
South-East Asia  3rd 2nd 
Source: UNCTAD (2014) & Thomson Reuters Eikon (2015) 
 
Despite the popularity of growth strategies based on CBA, the challenges of execution are 
substantial where the failure rates reported by several sources are high ranging from 40% to 80% 
(Dunbar, 2014; Rahim, Ahmad, Ahmad, & Rahim, 2013 ). It was also reported that globally 
companies spent more than $2 trillion on all types of acquisition every year but experienced failure 
rates as high as 70% to 90% (Bunce, 2013; Christensen, Alton, Rising, & Waldeck, 2011). More 
specifically for Malaysian market, PwC’s surveys show that 70% of the M&As fail in general (The 
Edge Malaysia, July 9, 2012).  
 
The high failure rate of the CBA has motivated studies on the wealth effect of CBA. However, the 
results are mixed. For example, positive returns were shown by Francis et. al (2014) in United 
State, Banerjee, Banerjee, De, Jindra, and Mukhopadhyay (2014) in India, Khin, Lee, and Yee 
(2012) in Malaysia whereas negative returns were shown by Wang, Shih, and Lin (2014) in Asia 
and Bertrand and Betschinger (2012) in Russia.  Basuil and Datta (2015) in US and Chakrabarti 
(2007) in India show the insignificant or neutral return for acquiring firms.  
 
While the variation in shareholders’ returns are shown to be explained by cultural similarities and 
distance (Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee, and Jayaraman, 2009), predecessors' acquisition activity 
(Francis et al., 2014), bidders’ prior expericences (Basuil and Datta, 2015) and the level of R&D 
involved (Francoeur, 2006), agency costs at the time CBA decisions were concluded could be 
another potential explanation. Jensen and Meckling (1976) posit an argument that separation of 
ownership and control result in agency problems due to inconsistent interests of the management 
and the shareholders where managers may pursue objectives other than shareholders’ wealth 
maximization and have the tendency to over invest excess cash under their control. This conflict 
gives rise to agency costs, which reduce the value of the firm. In the context of CBA, managers 
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may have the tendency to pursue international expansion, referred to by Jensen as ‘empire 
building’, with less consideration to shareholders’ wealth creation. Hence, acquirers with higher 
agency costs arguably would have lower shareholders’ returns. 
 
Little is known about Malaysian acquirers’ performance following CBA as most studies on this 
topic were conducted in the context of developed countries. In addition, the performance measure 
used in the few available studies on Malaysia’s CBA is either short run Cumulative Abnormal 
Return (CAR) (e.g., Amin Noordin, Kamarudin, & Mohamad Anwar, 2015; Bhagat, Malhotra, & 
Zhu, 2011) or long run CAR (e.g., Khin et al., 2012). Short run CAR can be criticized for not 
accurately measuring and capturing the full effect of an event in a short-run stock market reaction. 
This is because its assumption that the market possesses information about the event in an efficient 
and unbiased manner most likely does not hold in many emerging markets, including Malaysia, 
where the capital markets are not fully efficient (Minai, Ibrahim & Uddin, 2017). Moreover, the 
complexity and ambiguity involved in CBA activities amplify the magnitude of informational 
efficiency of the CBA decisions in these markets. Long run CAR has been used to overcome the 
pitfall of short run CAR but it too has been criticized as an inappropriate measurement for long run 
wealth effect due to measurement bias, new listing bias, and rebalancing bias (Barber & Lyon, 
1997). In addition, the study of Khin et al. has a weakness in terms of a short dataset from 2004 to 
2008. 
 
This study attempts to examine whether Malaysian acquirers’ performance following CBA is 
explained by agency costs by investigating the relationship between long run shareholders effect 
using Buy and Hold Abnormal Return (BHAR) and several agency costs proxies. A sample of 178 
CBA deals involving public listed acquirers during the period 2004 to 2015 was utilized. 
  
The novel contribution of this study is in terms of revealing the applicability of corporate finance 
theories in explaining CBA performance in an emerging market where CBA are aggressively 
undertaken and high failure rates of CBA are reported using long term datasets and robust 
performance measures and analyses. Many influencing factors driving CBA in Malaysia are 
substantially different from those in other emerging markets, such as cultural background and 
international exposure (Bhagat et al., 2011), and possible different CBA strategies are pursued 
(Bhagat et al., 2011; Buckley, 2004) which justify undertaking a study on Malaysian CBA. 
 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the related 
empirical literature so as to guide the research framework.  Section 3 describes the methodology 




2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES 
 
Based on past-related theoretical and empirical literature, the research framework and hypotheses 
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2.1. Dependent Variable 
 
One-, two-, and three-year shareholder buy and hold abnormal returns (BHAR) are used as 
alternative dependent variables in this study to represent acquirers’ performance. This measure has 
been widely used in previous long run performance studies (e.g., Chan, Ikenberry, & Lee, 2004; 
Datta, Iskandar-Datta, & Raman, 2000; Ibrahim, Uddin, Mohd, & Minai, 2013; Lyon, Barber, & 
Tsai, 1999; Minai et al. 2017; Ritter, 1991) and able to capture the wealth effect of an event when 
market is not fully efficient.  
 
2.2.  Independent Variables 
 
The following variables and their hypothesized impact on acquirers’ long run performance are 
derived: 
 
a)  Free Cash Flow (FCF) 
 
FCF is commonly used as a proxy for agency costs based on Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow 
hypothesis. According to the theory, firm generating cash in excess of that required to fund positive 
net present value projects have higher tendency to waste corporate resources, take value decreasing 
investment and inefficient resource allocation, and therefore face greater agency problems 
(Ibrahim & Minai, 2009; Minai et al, 2017; Wang, 2010). It is thus expected that companies with 
high FCF have a high tendency to embark on CBA to fulfil the top management’s desire for empire 
building without detail consideration of the project financial viability.  
 
Harford (1999) argues that with large cash holdings, managers may tend to favor their self-interests 
by engaging in acquisitions with decreasing value. More so, Boateng and Bi (2014) and Du, 
Boateng and Newton (2015) assert that such excess free cash holdings may lead managers to 
incorrectly evaluate targets and overvalue acquisitions paid for, thereby resulting in poor long-run 
performance. Therefore, the following alternative hypothesis is specified: 
 
H1a: Acquirers with higher FCF have lower long run performance following CBA 
 
b)  Board ethnic diversity 
 
Diversity can enhance a board’s independence of thought so that the board can better perform its 
monitoring function (Erhardt, Werbel, & Shrader, 2003; Adams & Ferreira, 2009).  Several studies, 
including those on Malaysia market, found support for this argument when the level of ethnic 
diversity is associated with firm performance. Carter, D'Souza, Simkins, and Simpson (2010) have 
used an “ethnic directors only” in their study of U.S. firms. They found that the level of ethnic 
minority directors and firm performance is related. A study by Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2013) on 
Malaysian firms which examines the effects of board diversity (in terms of gender, ethnicity and 
age) of the top 100 non-financial firms on firm performance found that ethnic diversity has positive 
relationship with firm performance (measured by return on asset). It can thus be argued that ethnic 
diversity in Malaysia reduce agency costs which results in better CBA decisions.  Hence, the 
following alternative hypothesis is thus specified: 
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H1b:  Acquirers with high board ethnic diversity have better long run performance 
following CBA 
 
c)  Board gender diversity 
 
Drawing on argument from Adams & Ferreira (2009) on board diversity’s role in enhancing board-
monitoring function, board gender diversity arguably is another proxy for agency costs. Empirical 
studies that have examined the role of board gender diversity on firm performance are in support 
of this. Huse and Solberg (2006) show that the presence of women on board meetings improves 
the quality of board deliberations of complex issues, and thereby reduces the occurrence of major 
decision missteps. In particular, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that female directors have better 
attendance records and that male directors in gender-diverse boards are less likely to have 
attendance problems. 
 
However, studies on Malaysian market show mixed results. Abdullah and Ku Ismail (2013) show 
that gender diversity has negative impact on firm performance (measured by Tobin’s q and return 
on asset), while Abdullah, Ku Ismail and Nachum (2016) find that the presence of female directors 
on boards of Malaysian companies generates value for some firms while it decreases it for others. 
Thus, it is hypothesized as follows: 
 
H1c: Firms with high board gender diversity have better long run performance following 
CBA 
 
d)  Board Independence 
 
Independent directors, also referred to as non-executive directors, are defined as those that do not 
have any association with the organization they work with except for their directorship or perhaps 
holding a small proportion of organization’s ownership (Bliss, 2011). It is generally assumed that 
independent directors act as an affective internal governance mechanism in companies and 
therefore higher level of board independence results in less agency costs. In a recent study, Badru 
and Raji (2016) find that the proportion of independent directors has significant positive influence 
on company performance.  
 
On the contrary, stewardship theory argues that boards dominated by insider members made better 
strategic decisions since the insiders are better informed about the firms’ operation. Agarwal and 
Knoeber (1996) finds support for this theory. As the focus of this study is on agency cost theory, 
the following hypothesis is specified:  
 
H1d: Firms with high level of board independence have better long run performance 
following CBA 
 
e)  Managerial Ownership 
 
According to Jensen and Meckling (1976), high managerial ownership should reduce the agency 
cost of equity because managers’ interests would be more aligned with those of the shareholders. 
This is consistent with the Jensen’s (1993) ‘convergence of interest’ hypothesis. Rashid (2016) 
argues that when a firm manager possesses a large ownership stake in a firm, this allows the 
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manager to refrain from self-opportunistic behaviour and thus reduces the firm agency costs. As a 
result, managerial ownership enhances better utilisation of firm resources, as managers will be the 
best stewards of their firms. Hence, firms with high managerial ownership are associated with 
lower agency costs, resulting in greater alignment of CBA decisions with shareholders’ wealth. It 
is therefore hypothesised that: 
 
H1e: Firms with high level of managerial ownership have better long run performance 
following CBA 
 
f)  Institutional ownership  
 
Firms with large institutional ownership mostly buy large percentage of outstanding shares of 
company and by so doing can largely influence its management. Due to large amount of investment 
that institutions engage in, they are more knowledgeable and skillful compared with other average 
investors particularly when it comes to companies and industries they have invested. Given the 
managerial skills, talent and substantial resources possessed by institutional investors, they tend to 
monitor and actively supervise investee companies and by so doing lessen the agency problem and 
maximize shareholders’ wealth (Lin & Fu, 2017). Since institutional ownership enhances corporate 
governance structure of a firm and reduces agency costs, the study proposes the following 
hypothesis: 
 
H1e: Firms with high level of institutional ownership have better long run performance 
following CBA 
 
2.3.  Control Variables 
 
Previous literature has shown that the following variables influence the post CBA performance of 
acquirers hence these variables are modeled as the control variables.  
 
a)  Firm Size 
 
Roll (1986) hubris hypothesis states that larger firms have higher tendency to face negative 
performance since their managers may be more prone to hubris, given their past success in growing 
the company. Hence, size is used as one of the control variables (Gubbi, Aulakh, Ray, Sarkar, & 
Chittoor, 2010).  
 
b)  Mode of payment 
 
Based on the signaling role of equity in corporate acquisitions, Myers and Majluf (1984) argue that 
if bad news is about to come, the manager will endeavor to ‘beat the market’ by dispensing 
overvalued equity. Hence, a firm offering stock as payment for CBA gives signal to the investors 
that the stock is overvalued. Therefore, mode of the payment is used as another control variable 
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c)  Level of control in target firm 
 
 
Chari, Ouimet, and Tesar (2010) show that acquirers of emerging market targets realize a 
statistically significant abnormal returns when acquirers gains majority control of target. Hence, in 





3.1.  Data Analysis Methodology 
 
The results of long run event study are sensitive to both the methodology used and the benchmark 
employed (Agrawal, Jaffe, & Mandelker, 1992; Pontiff & Woodgate, 2008; Rau & Vermaelen, 
1998; Uddin, 2012). This is why using appropriate method to calculate abnormal returns and 
comparing them to an appropriate benchmark are the two most important aspects of determining 
long run wealth effect.  In this study, we used BHAR approach of post-event performance with 
characteristics-based benchmark. 
 
3.1.1.  Buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR) 
 
The first step of calculating BHAR is to calculate the holding period returns of firm i for the 
analysis period in months (T), 
 
 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖,𝑇 = ∏(1 +
𝑇
𝑡=1
𝑟𝑖𝑡) − 1 (1) 
 
Where, rit is the monthly raw return of firm i in month t. By using the same calculation, the holding 
period return for the benchmark b is  
 
 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑏,𝑇 = ∏(1 + 𝑟𝑏𝑡)
𝑇
𝑡=1
− 1 (2) 
 
The buy-and-hold abnormal returns for each firm i in month t after benchmark adjustment is the 
difference between the buy-and-hold returns of the firm and the benchmark: 
 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐵𝐻𝑅𝑏𝑡 (3) 
 
Equation (3) was used for calculating the value weighted (wi) mean of the buy-and-hold abnormal 
return (BHAR) for month t as follows: 
 
 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑡̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ ̅ = ∑ 𝑤𝑖
𝑛𝑡
𝑖=1
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡  (4) 
 
Identification of the benchmark firms based on size and book-to-market ratio is very common in 
long run event study literature following Barber & Lyon (1997) (Ibrahim et al., 2013; Minai et al, 
2017). Several conditions are satisfied before considering any firms as a benchmark candidate firm. 
The study follows numerous empirical studies such as Berry, Guillén, & Zhou (2010), Van Heerde, 
Gijsbrechts, & Pauwels (2008) that use Euclidean Distance (ED) as a matching estimator. We 
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calculate the ED between each of the acquirer in the sample and the benchmark candidates based 
on the size measured by market capitalization of the firm, and market-to-book ratio.  





EDibt = Euclidean distance between sample firm i and benchmark candidate b for the CBA event 
in month t. 
t = CBA event month of acquiring firm or sample firm. So (t-1) mean previous month of the event 
month. 
mvi(t-1)   =  standardized1 market value of sample firm in month t -1 
mvb(t-l) = standardized market value of benchmark candidate, in month t-1 
mbi(t-1) = standardized market-to-book value of sample firm in month t-1   
mbb(t-1)= standardized market-to-book value of benchmark candidate, in month t-1.  
The weighted market value is given as: mvj(t−1) =
MVj(t−1)
∑ MV(t−1)
 and the weighted market-to-book value 




, where, 𝑀𝑉𝑗(𝑡−1) is the market capitalization of firm j in month 
t-1, MBj(t-1) is the market-to-book value of firm j, in month t – 1 and j = i, b for individual and 
benchmark firm, respectively. 
 
For each of the acquiring firm in month t, this calculation provides the distance of each of the 
benchmark candidates based on size and market-to-book ratio from equation 5. We then sorted the 
entire benchmark candidates based on this distance, for each of the firms in the sample. This sorting 
permits figuring out the nearest and subsequent matches of a particular firm in a particular month. 
For the estimation of long run abnormal return measured by BHAR, the average return of the two 
nearest available matching firms is considered as benchmark return. 
 
3.1.2. Regression Model 
 
To analyze the effect of agency costs proxies on post cross border acquisition performance of 
acquirers, the study uses the following regression model. 
𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑀𝐺𝑂 + 𝛽2 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑂 + 𝛽3 𝐹𝐶𝐹 + 𝛽4 𝐵𝐸𝐷 + 𝛽5 𝐵𝐺𝐷 + 𝛽6 𝑃𝐵𝐼𝑃 + 𝛽7𝐹𝑆𝐼𝑍 +




 𝐵𝐻𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡= the long run post cross border acquisition performance of acquirers, which represents 
12 months return, 24 months return and 36 months return.  𝛼 = intercept term, MGO = Managerial 
ownership, INSO = Institutional ownership, FCF = Free Cash Flow, BED = Board ethnic diversity, 
BGD =Board gender diversity, PBIP= Board independence, FSIZ = Firm size, LC= Level of 
control in target firm, MP = Mode of payment. 
 
Ordinary Least Square (OLS) regressions were first fitted, but due to heteroscedasticity problem 
Weight Least Square (WLS) were utilized. T tests were then run to conclude about the significance 
of the coefficient for the agency cost variables, namely MGO, INSO, FCF, BED, BGD and PBIP. 
3.1.3.  Measurement of explanatory variables 
                                                            
1 Standardized value of a firm is value of a firm over total market value for a particular period. 
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The measurements used are as in Table 2 
. 
 
Table 2: Measurement of the Explanatory Variables 
Name of the variable Measurement of the variable Support for the measurement 
Managerial Ownership The percentage of total 
outstanding shares held by the 
executive or managing directors. 
Minai, Uddin and Ibrahim (2017) 
Institutional Ownership Percentage of firm’s common 
stock owned by institutional 
investors. 
Lin and Fu (2017) 
Free Cash Flow Free cash flowa by total assets Minai, Uddin and Ibrahim (2017), 
Ibrahim and Minai (2009) 
Board ethnic diversity The level of ethnic diversity is 
measured using the Herfindahl 
Hirshman Index (HHI)b. 
Cheong & Sinnakkannu (2014) 
Board gender diversity 1 if the firm’s board of directors 
has at least one female member; 0 
otherwise. 
Terjesen, Couto, and Francisco 
(2016), Abdullah, Ku Ismail and 
Nachum (2016) 
Board Independence The proportion of independent 
directors by board size. 
Badru and Raji (2016) 
Firm Size Natural log of firm’s total asset. Ibrahim and Minai (2009), Ibrahim 
and Hwei (2010) 
Level of control in target 
firm 
The percentage of control in 
target firms. 
Aybar and Ficici (2009), Narayan and 
Thenmozhi, (2014) 
Mode of payment 1 if the mode of payment is cash; 
0 otherwise. 
Khin, Lee, and Yee (2012) 
Note: aFree cash flow is the operating activities represent the net cash receipts and disbursements resulting from the 
operations of the company.  
bThe Herfindahl Index is estimated by one minus the sum of the squared proportion of each ethnic. 
 
3.2.  Data and Sample selection  
 
The data of the acquiring firm’s ethnic diversity and gender diversity were collected from the Bursa 
Malaysia website, respective company’s prospectus and annual report. CBA characteristics 
including mode of payment and level of control in target firm were collected from Thomson 
Reuter’s database. In addition, monthly stock return index, market capitalization, market-to-book 
value, and annual cash flow statements were collected from the Datastream database. 
 
Initial list of all CBA deals of acquiring firms from 1, January 2004 to 31, December 2015 period 
were extracted from Thomson Reuters Eikon and Datastream databases. This list contains the 
information on the announcement date, effective date, acquirer name, CBA deal characteristics and 
percentage of acquisitions in target firm etc. for Malaysian acquiring companies.  Since the long 
run value of acquirer (post-acquisition performance) would be examined for 3-year post-
acquisition period, announcements after January 2015 were excluded respectively for the samples. 
The list of number of CBA deals has a total of 178 for 3, 2, 1-year performance sample.  
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Pending and withdrawn deals, unknown status, intended rumors, dismissed rumors, and intent 
withdrawn type of deals were considered uncompleted deals and thus excluded from the sample. 
Multiple deals within the post period were also omitted. In total, the size for one-, two-, and three-
year performance analyses are 178 along with their respective companies.  
 
 
4. ANALYSES AND FINDINGS 
 
4.1.  Descriptive Analysis 
 
Table 4 shows the descriptive statistics of variables used in the study. In terms of value-weighted 
buy-and-hold abnormal, BH3 exhibits the highest maximum value compared to BH1 and BH2, 
while BH2 has the lowest maximum value.  
 
The average institutional ownership (INSO) is 12.89%, while the average managerial ownership 
(MGO) is 14%. The mean value of the cash flow (FCF) appears to be high, even though some firms 
recorded negative FCF while engaging in cross-border acquisitions activity.  
 
Concerning gender and ethnic diversity, the table shows that acquiring firms’ board members are 
diverse by ethnicity and gender. Malaysia composes of three main ethnic groups, namely Malays, 
Chinese, and Indians. Major board members are either Chinese or Malays. On the average, about 
15.4% of these races are represented on board of directors while the proportion of female 
representation is about 46.6%. The increased proportion of female on board of director is in line 
with the Malaysian government target to promote female representation on the board of directors 
of listed companies to at least 30% by the year 2020.  
 
With respect to the level of control in target firms and mode of payment, Malaysian acquirers have 
higher level of control in target firms abroad with the proportion of about 70%. Moreover, most of 
mode of payment is cash, representing about 68% of deals. 
  
 
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
BH1 178 0.00004 0.00237 -0.01742 0.01893 
BH2 178 0.00002 0.00248 -0.01999 0.01525 
BH3 178 0.00028 0.00418 -0.02569 0.02703 
MGO 178 0.01438 0.03278 0.00000 0.35209 
INSO 178 0.12881 0.11567 0.00980 0.78820 
FCF 178 0.35741 2.02440 -1.64435 22.74037 
BED 178 0.15433 0.09602 0.00000 0.44444 
BGD 178 0.46629 0.50027 0 1 
PBIP 178 0.43478 0.14205 0 1 
FSIZ 178 5.51289 0.72049 3.41447 7.59834 
LC 178 0.70268 0.31807 0.05 1 
MP 178 0.67978 0.46788 0 1 
Notes: BH1, BH2 and BH3 represent BHAR, which is a 12-, 24-and 36-month return, respectively. MGO= Managerial 
ownership, INSO= Institutional ownership, FCF= Free cash flow. BED = Board ethnic diversity.  PBIP= Ratio of 
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independent directors on the board to board size. FSIZ = Firm size. LC= Percentage of acquisition in target firm, BGD = is 
a dummy variable representing the presence of female board member, MP = is a dummy variable representing the mode of 
payment.  
   
A correlation analysis among all the variables used was executed to observe whether there are 
significant correlations among variables. Table 5 presents the results of the correlations and it can 
be seen that none of the correlations is above 0.7 which according to Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson 
(2010) do not indicate the presence of multicollinearity problem.  
 
 
Table 5:  Correlation Results (BHAR Models) 
 BH1 BH2 BH3 MGO INSO FCF BED BGD PBIP FSIZ LC MP 
BH1 
1.00            
 
            
BH2 
0.60a 1.00           
 
(0.00)            
BH3 
0.68 a 0.78 a 1.00          
 
(0.00) (0.00)           
MGO 
-0.03 0.00 -0.04 1.00         
 
(0.66) (0.98) (0.63)          
INSO 
-0.08 -0.03 -0.01 0.23a 1.00        
 
(0.27) (0.71) (0.91) (0.00)         
FCF 
-0.01 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.26a 1.00       
 
(0.95) (0.96) (0.89) (0.89) (0.00)        
BED 
0.06 0.05 0.12 -0.04 -0.12 c -0.09 1.00      
 
(0.39) (0.53) (0.11) (0.59) (0.10) (0.24)       
BGD 
-0.02 -0.07 -0.11 0.05 0.00 0.15 b -0.13c 1.00     
 
(0.78) (0.37) (0.13) (0.47) (0.96) (0.04) (0.08)      
PBIP 
0.00 -0.02 -0.04 -0.06 0.16 b -0.07 0.56 a -0.13c 1.00    
 
(0.95) (0.82) (0.63) (0.39) (0.03) (0.36) (0.00) (0.08)     
FSIZ 
-0.07 -0.20 a -0.04 -0.08 0.20 a -0.28 a 0.08 -0.06 0.13c 1.00   
 
(0.32) (0.01) (0.62) (0.28) (0.01) (0.00) (0.29) (0.42) (0.09)    
LC 
-0.05 0.07 0.01 -0.04 -0.06 0.00 0.07 0.06 0.02 -0.01 1.00  
 
(0.51) (0.35) (0.93) (0.60) (0.40) (0.98) (0.35) (0.41) (0.79) (0.88)   
MP 
0.11 0.06 0.04 -0.02 0.00 0.07 -0.04 0.11 -0.17 b -0.09 0.11 1.00 
 
(0.13) (0.46) (0.58) (0.78) (0.97) (0.35) (0.60) (0.14) (0.02) (0.26) (0.14)  
Note: BH1, BH2 and BH3 represent BHAR, which is a 12-, 24-and 36-month return. Other variables are as defined 
earlier. The figure in parenthesis represents P-value. a, b & c represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, 
respectively. 
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4.2. Regression Analysis 
 
Initial regression analysis shows the presence of homoscedasticity problems so the study applies 
weighted least squares (WLS) regression following the procedures suggested by Agung (2011). 
Table 7 presents the results of applying WLS regression using MGO as a weighted variable. 
 
 
Table 7: Results of weighted least square regression 
Model BHAR1 BHAR2 BHAR3 
Constant 0.0030 -0.0010 -0.0206*** 
 (0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0078) 
MGO -0.5425 -0.6336* -2.7682** 
 (0.3575) (0.3305) (1.1558) 
INSO 0.0123*** 0.0151*** 0.0497*** 
 (0.0020) (0.0019) (0.0066) 
FCF -0.0004 -0.0002 0.0002 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0018) 
BED 0.0109*** 0.0122*** 0.0394*** 
 (0.0015) (0.0014) (0.0049) 
BGD 0.0016*** 0.0007** 0.0001 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0012) 
PBIP -0.0111*** -0.0167*** -0.0680*** 
 (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0037) 
FSIZ -0.0006 0.0008** 0.0069*** 
 (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0012) 
LC 0.0027*** 0.0011** 0.0043*** 
 (0.0005) (0.0005) (0.0017) 
MP 0.0006** 0.0002 0.0009 
 (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0009) 
 
   
R2 0.8742 0.9525 0.9699 
Adj. R2 0.8662 0.9495 0.9680 
 Notes: ***, ** and * represent 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. The figure in parenthesis represents 
standard error. 
BH1, BH2 and BH3 represent BHAR, which is a 12-, 24-and 36-month return, respectively.             MGO= Managerial 
ownership, INSO= Institutional ownership, FCF= Free cash flow. BED = Board ethnic diversity.  PBIP= Ratio of 
independent directors on the board to board size. FSIZ = Firm size. LC= Percentage of acquisition in target firm, BGD = 
is a dummy variable representing the presence of female board member, MP = is a dummy variable representing the mode 
of payment.  
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The results suggest that both managerial ownership (MGO) and institutional ownership (INSO) 
play important role in influencing the long run performance of Malaysian acquirers. In particular, 
INSO has significant positive influence on the one-, two-and three-year long run performance at 
the 1% level, supporting the proposition made earlier. This implies that higher institutional 
ownership leads to active monitoring and supervision of investee companies. Consequently, the 
results suggest that institutional ownership enhances corporate governance structure of a firm, 
reduces agency costs and improves long-run performance of CBA decisions. However, MGO has 
significant (though at 5% level) negative impact on the three-year long-term returns of Malaysian 
firms. It is argued that firms with high managerial ownership are associated with lower agency 
costs, resulting in greater alignment of CBA decisions with shareholders’ wealth (Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976). Surprisingly, we do not find evidence in support of this argument.   
  
The results also indicate that FCF has a significant negative impact on the post cross-border 
acquisition long run performance of Malaysian acquirers. This evidence shows that Jensen’s (1986) 
free cash flow theory is applicable in explaining post-merger and acquisition performance of 
Malaysian companies’ acquirer. 
 
With respect to board ethnic diversity (BED) and board gender diversity (BGD), our study 
indicates that both of them are among the important factors that determine shareholder’s wealth. 
Specifically, the results show that BED has positive significant influence on the three different 
measures of long-term returns of Malaysian acquirers. It implies that the more the representative 
of various races on board, the better the post CBA long run performance. Our result is consistent 
with those found by Erhardt et al. (2003), and Adams and Ferreira (2009) in which they argue that 
the level of ethnic diversity is associated with firm performance. Similarly, BGD also exerts 
positive significant influence on the one-and two-year measures of long run performance of 
Malaysian acquirers. The result supports the findings of Huse and Solberg (2006), and Adams and 
Ferreira (2009) that show that the presence of women on board meetings improves the quality of 
board deliberations of complex issues as well as firm performance.  
 
However, we find significant negative impact of board independence (PBIP) on all measures of 
long run performance at the 1% level. Similar evidence of a negative relationship between board 
independence and shareholders’ wealth has been reported by Bhagat and Black (2001). The 
negative relationship between board independence and post CBA performance indicates that 
having a higher number of non-executive directors on board may be detrimental to the company. 
This is because such directors may lack the business knowledge to initiate strategic decisions or 
engage in investment opportunities that can improve the company performance. This finding 
supports the argument of Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) that appointment of independent directors on 
board of Malaysian companies may likely not be based on directors’ expertise or experience, rather 
more often for political reasons, to legitimize business activities and for contacts and contracts. 
 
 
5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
 
This study examines the influence of various agency cost proxies namely managerial ownership 
(MGO), institutional ownership (INSO), free cash flow (FCF), female board member (BGD) and 
board ethnic diversity (BED) on the long-term returns of Malaysian acquirers to verify the agency 
problems influence on CBA performance.  
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The long run performance of CBA is measured by one-, two- and three-year buy and hold returns 
(BHAR). Using Weighted Least Square regression, our findings suggest that CBA performance is 
influenced by agency costs of the acquirers at the time the strategic decisions were made, whereby 
those with lower agency costs, characterized by higher INSO, higher BGD, and higher BED are 
shown to record higher performance. 
 
The results obtained in this study have implications for the corporate governance literature in the 
sense that they show how different governance variables improve decision-making related to CBA, 
and that shareholder returns can be increased with effective corporate governance in place by 
lessening conflicts between the shareholders and agents (managers).  
 
These findings are consistent with Abdullah et. al (2016), also on Malaysian stock market, which 
indicates the effectiveness of gender diversity, ethnic diversity and executive directorship in 
increasing firm performance. The negative effect of non-executive directorship in this study shows 
the dominance of stewardship theory on the effectiveness of insiders in making strategic decisions, 
particularly CBA decisions, over the monitoring role of independent directors in reducing agency 
costs associated with these decisions. The claim by Haniffa and Hudaib (2006) that “in most 
developing countries, including Malaysia, independent directors are not appointed based on their 
experience and expertise, but merely to serve a political agenda in order to legitimize and facilitate 
business activities” (Hassan, Karbhari, Mohd Isa and Razak (2017; p. 77)). 
 
The findings also have some implications for concerned firms and regulators. For example, our 
results suggest that institutional investors are important factor for sourcing value creation for CBA 
in Malaysia, an emerging country. Since institutional ownership enhances corporate governance 
structure of a firm and reduces agency cost, there is a need for regulators to ensure that institutional 
shareholders are attracted to have large shareholding in firm engaging in cross-border mergers and 
acquisitions.  
 
The results also indicate the important role of board ethnic and gender diversity in acquirers’ long 
run performance following cross-border mergers and acquisitions. Since Malaysians in recent 
times have been promulgating the lessening of racial restrictions, and encouraging an equitable 
share of economic well-being, the obligation of firms to ethnic diversity is likely to reflect the 
societal standards that in turn improve the legitimacy of firms. Therefore, policy makers and 
regulators ought to focus more on the Malaysian boards of directors’ racial structure.  
 
Concerning the role of female directors in firm performance, our findings indicate that the presence 
of female directors on boards enhances the acquirers’ returns of Malaysian post cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions. The significant positive effect of board gender diversity on post cross-
border mergers and acquisitions performance of Malaysian firm suggests that the presence of 
female directors on boards is an essential issue of corporate governance that deserves more 
attention. 
 
Finally, the negative impact of the proportion of independent nonexecutive directors on the post 
cross-border mergers and acquisitions performance of Malaysian firm suggests that there is lack 
of effective monitoring role. This might imply that majority of these independent nonexecutive 
directors are somehow related to each other or have similar ethnicity to the board’s majority race. 
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Therefore, there is a need for the concerned authorities to ensure greater enforcement of the 
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